Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments by Grimmett, Richard F.
Congressional Research Service ò The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS20775
January 10, 2001
Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since
1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and
Overseas Deployments
Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report provides background information on major instances, since 1970, when
Congress has utilized funding cutoffs to compel the withdrawal of United States military
forces from overseas military deployments. It also highlights key efforts by Congress  to
utilize the War Powers Resolution, since its enactment in 1973, to compel the withdrawal
of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments. In this  review, legislation expressing
the “sense of the Congress” regarding U.S. military deployments is not addressed. This
report will only be revised if significant new restrictions on use of appropriated funds
relating to U.S. force deployments overseas are enacted.
Introduction
In cases of significant differences with the President over foreign policy, especially
deployments of U.S. military forces abroad, Congress has generally found that use of its
Constitutionally-based “power of the purse” to be the most effective way to compel a
President to take actions regarding use of U.S. military force overseas that he otherwise
might not agree to.  Thus, on various occasions since the Vietnam War era, Congress has
used funding cutoffs or significant restrictions on the use of funds as a means of ending or
circumscribing the use of U.S. military personnel for foreign operations.  As the examples
set out below indicate, the use of funding cutoffs and restrictions to curtail or terminate
the President’s use of U.S. military force abroad has proven to be much more efficacious
in giving effect to Congress’s policy views in this area than has the War Powers
Resolution.
Congressional Funding Cutoffs since 1970 Utilized to Compel
Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Overseas Deployments
Indochina.  During the last years of the Vietnam War, there were a number of
efforts in Congress to attach amendments to legislation to restrict military actions by the
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United States in the Indochina region, as part of a larger effort to compel the withdrawal
of U.S. military forces from the area.  Nearly all of these proposals did not pass more than
one House of Congress due to vigorous opposition from the President to them.  Those
that did succeed in passage are as follows:
! In late December 1970, Congress cleared H.R. 19911, P.L. 91-652, for
the President. This Supplemental Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act
prohibited the use of funds to finance the introduction of United States
ground combat troops into Cambodia or to provide U.S. advisors to or
for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia. As part of the compromise
between Congress and the President that led to the enactment of H.R.
19911, similar curbs that had been placed in other legislation in
1970—specifically H.R. 15628, P.L. 91-672 (the Foreign Military Sales
Act), and H.R. 19580, P.L. 91-668 (the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act), were deleted.
! In late June 1973, Congress cleared H.R. 9055, P.L. 93-50, the second
Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY1973, for the President’s
signature. This legislation contained language cutting off funds for combat
activities in Indochina after August 15, 1973. Its text read: “None of the
funds herein appropriated under this act may be expended to support
directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North
Vietnam, and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August
15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may
be expended for such purpose.” 
! In a related action, Congress completed action on June 30, 1973 on
H.J.Res. 636, P.L. 93-52, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for
FY1974. This legislation contained language similar to that in H.R. 9055.
The language in H.J.Res. 636 read: “Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or
indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or
from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or
Cambodia.”  
! In December 1974, Congress completed passage of S. 3394, P.L. 93-559
(the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974), which contained a provision setting
a personnel ceiling of 4,000 Americans in Vietnam 6 months after
enactment and 3,000 Americans within one year.
More recent examples of congressional funding limitations aimed at preventing or
reducing U.S. military deployments overseas relate to Somalia and to Rwanda. These
enacted limitations are as follows.
Somalia.  Section 8151 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
FY1994, P.L. 103-139, signed in November 1993, approved the use of U.S. Armed Forces
for certain purposes, including combat forces in a security role to protect United Nations
units in Somalia, but cut off funding after March 31, 1994, except for a limited number of
military personnel to protect American diplomatic personnel and American citizens, unless
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further authorized by Congress. In late September 1994, Section 8135 of the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995, P.L. 103-335, stated that “None of the funds
appropriated by this Act may be used for the continuous presence in Somalia of United
States military personnel after September 30, 1994.”
Rwanda.  In September 1994, through Title IX of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for FY1995, P.L. 103-335, Congress stipulated that “no funds
provided in this Act are available for United States military participation to continue
Operation Support Hope in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any
action that is necessary to protect the lives of United States citizens.”
Congressional Use of the War Powers Resolution to Compel
Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces Deployed Overseas
Since its enactment in 1973, there is no specific instance when the Congress has
successfully utilized the War Powers Resolution to compel the withdrawal of U.S. military
forces from foreign deployments against the President’s will.  Every President from
President Nixon forward has taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an
unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
to utilize the Armed Forces of the United States to defend what he determines are the vital
national security interests of the United States. It should be noted, however, that through
a compromise with the Congress in September 1983, President Reagan agreed to the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, P.L. 98-119, that determined that the
requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on
August 29, 1983, and that Congress authorized the continued participation of the U.S.
Marines in the Lebanon Multinational Force for 18 months. President Reagan signed P.L.
98-119 on October 12, 1983. Soon after enactment of P.L. 98-119, 241 U.S. Marines in
Lebanon were killed on October 23, 1983 by a suicide truck bombing. On February 7,
1984, President Reagan announced the Marines would be redeployed and on March 30,
1984, reported to Congress that U.S. participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon
had ended. 
It is also important to note that beginning in August 1990, following the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, President Bush over a period of months deployed a substantial number
of U.S. military personnel to Saudi Arabia to defend U.S. friends in the region, and, in an
effort to induce Iraq to withdraw its military forces from Kuwait. These actions were taken
without express authorization by Congress under the War Powers Resolution or any other
Act of Congress. Months later in January 1991, Congress  passed H.J.Res. 77, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, P.L. 102-1, which
President Bush signed on January 14, 1991. In that legislation Congress declared that
H.J.Res. 77 constituted specific statutory authorization for the President to use United
States Armed Forces to achieve objectives set out in various cited United Nations
Resolutions relating to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait, if he made a certification to
Congress that such use of force was necessary. Congress also noted in this bill that it
constituted the authorization contemplated by section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
However, in his signing statement regarding H.J.Res. 77,  President Bush noted the
following: “As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for
congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any
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change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President’s
constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. I am pleased, however, that differences
on these issues between the President and many in the Congress have not prevented us
from uniting in a common objective.” The President, in short, did not characterize a
request for “congressional support” for his actions as a request for “congressional
authorization” of them. Although, Congress, for its part, characterized its action as a
requisite “authorization.” 
More recently, controversy over U.S. military involvement in Kosovo led to an effort
to use the War Powers Resolution as a means to address the question of whether the
President could order U.S. combat activity abroad in the absence of Congressional
authorization to do so.  This debate began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President
Clinton notified the Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution”, that on March
24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and in coalition with NATO allies, had
commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government’s
campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.
The President’s action, taken in the absence of Congressional authorization, led to efforts
to use the War Powers Resolution as a vehicle to either support or overturn the
President’s actions.  Congress also attempted to use denial of funding for the Kosovo
operation.  On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1569, by a vote
of 249-180. This bill would have prohibited the use of funds appropriated to the Defense
Department from being used for the deployment of “ground elements” of the U.S. Armed
Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment was specifically
authorized by law. On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res. 82, by a vote of 139-
290. This resolution would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the
War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in connection
with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 28, 1999,
the House also defeated H.J. Res. 44, by a vote of 2-427. This joint resolution would have
declared a state of war between the United States and the “Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.” The House on that same day also defeated, on a 213-213 tie
vote, S.Con.Res. 21, the Senate resolution passed on March 23, 1999, that supported
military air  operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. On April 30, 1999,
Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other members of the House filed suit in Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to
obtain authorization from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military
action against Yugoslavia.     
The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res. 20, a joint
resolution, sponsored by Senator John McCain, that would authorize the President “to use
all necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish
United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” The House, on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-
301, defeated an amendment by Representative Ernest Istook to H.R. 1664, the FY1999
defense supplemental appropriations bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of
funds in the bill to implement any plan to use U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia,
except in time of war.  Congress, meanwhile, on May 20, 1999 cleared for the President’s
signature, H.R. 1141, an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY1999, that
provided billions in funding for the existing U.S. Kosovo operation.
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On May 25, 1999, the 60th day had passed since the President notified Congress of
his actions regarding U.S. participation in military operations in Kosovo.  Representative
Tom Campbell, and those who joined his suit, noted to the Federal District Court that this
was a clear violation of the language of the War Powers Resolution stipulating a
withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area of hostilities occur after 60 days in the absence
of congressional authorization to continue, or a presidential request to Congress for an
extra 30 day period to safely withdraw. The President did not seek such a 30 day
extension, noting instead that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective. On
June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge Paul L. Friedman dismissed the suit of Representative
Campbell and others that sought to have the court rule that President Clinton was in
violation of the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by conducting military
activities in Yugoslavia without having received prior authorization from Congress. The
judge ruled that Representative Campbell and others lacked legal standing to bring the suit
(Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999)).  Representative Campbell
appealed the ruling on June 24, 1999, to the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the District of
Columbia. The appeals court agreed to hear the case. On February 18, 2000, the appeals
court affirmed the opinion of the District Court that Representative Campbell and his co-
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the President. (Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). On May 18, 2000, Representative Campbell and 30 other Members of
Congress appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court.  On October 2,
2000, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to hear the appeal of
Representative Campbell thereby letting stand the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
(Campbell v. Clinton, cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000)(No. 99-1843).
Uses by Congress of Funding Restrictions to Affect Presidential
Policy Toward Foreign Military/Paramilitary Operations
Although not directly analogous to efforts to seek withdrawal of American military
forces from abroad by use of funding cutoffs, Congress has used funding restrictions to
limit or prevent foreign activities of a military or paramilitary nature. As such, these actions
represent alternative methods to affect elements of presidentially sanctioned foreign
military operations. Representative examples of these actions are in legislation relating to
Angola and Nicaragua, which are summarized below.
In 1976, controversy over U.S. covert assistance to paramilitary forces in Angola led
to legislative bans on such action.  These legislative restrictions are summarized below.
! The Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY1976, P.L. 94-212,
signed February 9, 1976, provided that none of the funds “appropriated
in this Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than
intelligence gathering....”  This funding limitation would expire at the end
of this fiscal year.  Consequently, Congress provided for a ban in
permanent law, which embraced both authorization and appropriations
acts, in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976.
! Section 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329, signed June 30, 1976, stated that
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind
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may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of
promoting, augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation,
group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or
paramilitary operations in Angola, unless and until Congress expressly
authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of
this section.”  This section also permitted the President to provide the
prohibited assistance to Angola if he made a detailed, unclassified report
to Congress stating the specific amounts and categories of assistance to
be provided and the proposed recipients of the aid.  He also had to certify
that furnishing such aid was “important to the national security interests
of the United States.”
! Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for FY1976, P.L. 94-330, signed June 30, 1976,
provided that “None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant
to this Act shall be obligated to finance directly or indirectly any type of
military assistance to Angola.”
In 1984, controversy over U.S. assistance to the opponents of the Nicaraguan
government (the anti-Sandinista guerrillas known as the “contras”) led to a prohibition on
such assistance in a continuing appropriations bill.  This legislative ban is summarized
below.
! The continuing appropriations resolution for FY1985, P.L. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1935-1937, signed October 12, 1984, provided that:  “During fiscal
year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the
purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation,
group, organization, movement or individual.”  This legislation also
provided that after February 28, 1985, if the President made a report to
Congress specifying certain criteria, including the need to provide further
assistance for “military or paramilitary operations” prohibited by this
statute, he could expend $14 million in funds if Congress passed a joint
resolution approving such action.
